Introduction:Hierarchy, value, and the value of hierarchy by Haynes, Naomi & Hickel, Jason
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hierarchy, Value, and the Value of Hierarchy
Citation for published version:
Haynes, N & Hickel, J 2016, 'Hierarchy, Value, and the Value of Hierarchy' Social Analysis , vol. 60, no. 4,
pp. 1-20. DOI: 10.3167/sa.2016.600401
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3167/sa.2016.600401
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Social Analysis
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  1 
Introduction:  
Hierarchy, Value, and the Value of Hierarchy 
 
Abstract: 
 
Many of the places where anthropologists work are hierarchically organized, and the 
people who live in these places often describe this arrangement in positive terms.  
Nevertheless, anthropologists rarely paint hierarchy in a favourable light.  This special 
issue aims to question this tendency with ethnographic insights into social contexts 
where hierarchy is regarded as a desirable social good.  By way of an introduction to 
the research articles, we explore those aspects of western thought that make it difficult 
for anthropologists to take hierarchy seriously.  In addition, we develop an 
interpretive approach that treats hierarchy both as a relational form and a theoretical 
model – that is, as a framework for understanding value – drawing in part on our own 
ethnographic research in southern Africa.  Our goal is to invigorate a discussion of 
hierarchy in a range of social contexts, especially as these have been shaped by 
globalizing forces like Christianity, development, democracy, and neoliberalism.   
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Modern man is virtually incapable of fully recognizing [hierarchy].   
For a start, he simply fails to notice it.   
If it does force itself on his attention  
he tends to eliminate it as an epiphenomenon.   
Should he finally accept it, as I did,  
he must still take pains to see it as it really is,  
without attributing imaginary properties to it.   
By contrast; all the difficulties vanish if we keep it firmly before our eyes, 
accustom ourselves to follow its outlines and implications, 
and rediscover the universe in which it operates. 
Dumont 1980: xlvii 
 
Hierarchy is not the sort of thing one typically hears western academics describe in 
positive terms.  There are both political and intellectual reasons why this is so.  With 
regard to the former, it is not difficult to see that the notion of hierarchy runs straight 
against the grain of the liberal sensibilities that most scholars share, and placing 
hierarchy in a favorable light therefore seems to fly in the face of these core political 
commitments.  In terms of the latter, in the current intellectual climate, perhaps 
particularly in anthropology, we are still struggling to get past the preoccupation with 
power that has been central to disciplinary thought over the past two decades.  As 
Marshall Sahlins (2004: 138-154) has pointed out, this orientation has produced a 
reductive overemphasis on the subject, which in turn has made it difficult to take 
cultural systems, including those characterized by hierarchy, seriously (also see Rio 
and Smedal 2009b: 2-3).  As Sahlins puts it, under these intellectual circumstances 
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such systems “appear as the political cum intellectual enemy,” monuments to 
structures of power that, when compared to “the experience-near, embodied world of 
excluded subjects, demanding their own identities and contesting the authoritative 
narratives of the larger society,” seem like inflexible anachronisms (Sahlins 2004: 
149). 
  
Despite these barriers to treating hierarchy as a serious object of study, much less as a 
positive social phenomenon, we believe that as anthropologists we cannot ignore this 
topic.  This is true first and foremost because many of the communities in which we 
work are hierarchically organized, and people in these communities often represent 
hierarchy in positive terms (e.g. Iteanu 2013, King 2014, Haynes 2012, Ansell 2010, 
Ferguson 2013, Smith 2007, Hickel 2015, Scherz 2014).  While individualism and 
egalitarianism are central to western conceptions of justice and the good, many people 
in hierarchical societies see them as immoral and destructive, as eroding the 
relationships that make meaningful personhood possible.  One of our primary aims in 
this special issue is therefore to explore a variety of ethnographic contexts in which 
hierarchy is portrayed as desirable, and to examine the role of hierarchy in people’s 
efforts to produce a social world that reflects their understanding of a good society 
(Robbins 2013a).  Situating hierarchy in local conceptions of the good life in turn 
opens the way for us to speak not only of hierarchical social organization, but also of 
values.  This connection is most immediately evident in the fact that when people 
speak positively of hierarchy, they are speaking about what they value.  Even more 
fundamentally, hierarchy draws our attention to the way that values are organized 
with respect to each other, since values are hierarchically ranked, with some being 
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more important than others.  Hierarchy is therefore a central component of any theory 
of value (Dumont 1980: 20).  
 
In light of these observations, our goal in this special issue is twofold.  First, as an 
ethnographic project, this volume foregrounds hierarchy as a mode of social 
organization, building on a solid foundation of important work (Rio and Smedal 
2009a, Mosko and Jolly 1994, Peacock 2015) in an effort to expand our 
understanding of the sorts of relational worlds that, for reasons we describe in more 
detail below, anthropologists have found difficult to engage in empathetic terms.  
Second, we seek to explore the central position of hierarchy in the process and 
production of value.  Here again we build on previous discussions in the discipline, 
where the topic of value is enjoying something of a revival (e.g. Graeber 2001; Otto 
and Wilerslev 2013; Robbins 1994, 2004, 2015; Eriksen 2012).  In what follows, 
then, we address hierarchy both as a mode of social organization and as a model for 
social theory, while also seeking out connections between these two approaches.  Our 
goal is to cultivate a conversation around the issue of hierarchy animated by difficult 
questions.  Why, for instance, should anthropologists – and especially young scholars 
interested in the neoliberal moment – be concerned with hierarchy?  What is the place 
of hierarchy in contemporary social theory?  How are we to think about reassertions 
of hierarchy in the era of globalization?  How have people leveraged ideas about 
hierarchy in order to challenge liberal models of the social good?  More specifically, 
how have societies re-imagined and reconfigured the ideas and institutions of 
Christianity, democracy, or development – which have figured so often in social 
theory as forces for egalitarianism and individualism – to suit their own hierarchical 
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values and goals?  And how has hierarchy itself been retooled, reinvigorated, or 
restructured, especially in contexts of social change and conjuncture?  
 
In this introduction, we offer a theoretical framework for these questions, which are 
variously engaged by the authors featured in this special issue.  We begin by 
specifying what we mean by hierarchy, and then go on to consider why this topic is 
especially difficult for contemporary western scholars, in particular, to think with.  
We follow this discussion with some short ethnographic examples from our own work 
in southern Africa that illustrate the importance of hierarchy in the specific contexts 
of Christian practice and political democratization.  These examples then open the 
way for a brief treatment of the topic of value.  We conclude by providing an 
overview of the various contributions to this special issue.   
 
Dealing with Dumont 
 
As we turn our attention to developing a definition of hierarchy, we begin by 
positioning ourselves in relationship to the theorist whose work has unquestionably 
had the greatest impact on anthropological engagement with this topic.  We have 
already invoked Louis Dumont in the epigraph above, and his influence is evident in 
this volume at several points.1  Beyond the fact that most of the contributions engage 
with Dumont directly, this introduction is also indebted to his work.  That said, we 
want to make clear from the outset an important distinction between our analysis and 
that which Dumont offers.  While we recognize the merit of Dumont’s holism, not 
least as an analytic device that brings many of the unquestioned assumptions of 
western individualism to the fore, in the discussion that follows we hope to avoid the 
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confusion that the tight coupling of holism and hierarchy in Dumont’s anthropology 
sometimes creates by drawing a distinction between what we mean by hierarchy as a 
model of value and hierarchy as a social form.   
 
In Dumont’s work, hierarchy and holism are inextricably linked.  This is because 
hierarchy for Dumont is defined by what he calls “encompassment,” and more 
specifically “[encompassment] of the contrary” (Dumont 1980: 240).  By this he is 
referring to the relationship between a whole and its parts; the latter are at once 
constitutive of and as such identical to the whole, and yet different from and as such 
contrary to it.2  Hierarchy therefore presupposes a whole.  In a detailed discussion of 
Dumont’s holism, Bruce Kapferer (2010) notes that for Dumont the whole is not 
social or territorial – it does not, in other words, connote the boundaries of a society 
or community – but is instead ideological: it is a system of ranked and competing 
values.  Dumont’s holism is therefore a methodology aimed at the comparative study 
of ideology across a large swathe of human existence – a method “that assumes that 
values in relations are never balanced or equivalent… but hierarchical when 
conceived through and defined in relation to the whole” (Kapferer 2010: 198-199). 
 
Given Kapferer’s clarifications, so far we find little to disagree with in Dumont.  As 
we describe in more detail below, the notion of hierarchy more generally is 
fundamental to any theory of value, and toward the development of such a theory 
hierarchical encompassment is a compelling idea.  That said, we are nevertheless 
cautious about taking up Dumont’s work for several reasons.  First, at least some 
readers will feel that Dumont has found in non-western societies not only a point of 
contrast to the modern West, but also, and more problematically, a perennial past in 
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the present (Fabian 1983, Appadurai 1988).  Faced with such critiques, one employs 
Dumont’s theory only at the risk of being thought guilty by association of a 
neocolonialist conceit.  So too, while we find it helpful to explore values in terms of 
hierarchical encompassment, we want to keep our distance from a reading of Dumont 
that cites his occasional references to a “paramount value” (e.g. Dumont 1986: 231) 
as evidence that all values can ultimately be reduced to one (see Robbins 2013b for an 
alternative reading of Dumont’s apparent “value monism”).  Finally, and most 
importantly for the purposes of this volume, we must make clear that the definition of 
hierarchy that Dumont puts forward for values – hierarchy as encompassment – is not 
the same as the definition of hierarchy that we will be using when we speak of it as a 
social form.  This requires a bit of explanation. 
 
For Dumont, social hierarchy comes from a kind of holism very different from the 
ideological holism we have just described.  In this second usage the whole is not “an 
analyst’s construction,” but rather “a conception in the indigenous culture” (Robbins 
1994: 31).  Here, the integrity of the whole is the central concern behind much, if not 
all, of social life, and the latter is therefore organized in such a way as to reproduce 
and reorient the whole on terms that are ideologically salient, such as the religious 
notion of purity.  In the light of this sociocultural definition of holism, it is no surprise 
that for Dumont social hierarchy is also marked by encompassment: in the Indian 
case, lower castes are encompassed by higher castes so as to preserve the purity of the 
whole.  It is in this interpretation of holism and hierarchy as social forms that we 
diverge from Dumont.  Laying aside the vexed question of whether holism is indeed 
an indigenous conception in south Asia (we leave that to the regional specialists), we 
nevertheless want to make clear that while there may be cultural settings in which 
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social hierarchy does take the form of encompassment, it is by no means necessary to 
define social hierarchy in these terms.3  Indeed, in this introduction we have chosen 
not to do so.  Rather, our definition of hierarchy as a social form refers not to 
encompassment, but rather to difference and asymmetry, and often also to rank.  
Examples from the ethnographic record of social hierarchy as we define it here 
include the rich literature on “clientistic” relationships (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980), 
seniority (e.g. Richards 1982, Pritchett 2001), and what James Ferguson (2013) has 
recently called ties of “dependence” (also see Barnes 1967, Bolt 2014, Scherz 2014).4  
In addition, we would note that in this definition it is possible for hierarchy to coexist 
with a certain kind of ontological egalitarianism.  While in some cases hierarchical 
sociality presupposes basic ontological difference – that is, the people who inhabit 
different ranks in the system are considered to be fundamentally different types of 
beings, as in the caste system as Dumont describes it – in other cases people are 
regarded as ontologically equivalent, and the various ranks of the system are 
theoretically and often actually open to anyone.  In such instances “egalitarian 
hierarchy” is not a contradiction in terms, but is rather an important analytical 
descriptor. 
 
In keeping with our reading of Dumont as we outlined it here, it should be clear that 
what is most interesting to us about hierarchical social arrangements is the way that 
they reveal particular ideological arrangements – topographies of value.  Put 
differently, we might say that we are not simply interested in hierarchy as such, but 
rather in why it is that hierarchy has emerged as so important in so many ethnographic 
contexts.  Addressing this issue means engaging with value, and more specifically 
with what values hierarchical relationships express.  In this way, while there are 
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certainly parts of Dumont’s complicated apparatus that we leave behind or do not take 
up here, our discussion in this introduction is offered very much in the spirit of 
Dumont, both in the connections we draw between social forms and values and in our 
insistence on the structuring influence and hierarchical arrangement of the latter.  It is 
in a similar spirit that we now turn our attention to a more detailed discussion of the 
problems that attention to hierarchy – and particularly attention to hierarchy as a 
moral good – raises in contemporary anthropology.   
 
The problem of hierarchy 
 
We are by no means the first anthropologists to observe that hierarchy represents an 
uncomfortable topic for the discipline.  As Dumont’s words have already reminded 
us, hierarchy has for decades presented a problem to modern, western anthropologists.   
One of the reasons for this is that anthropology – and particularly American cultural 
anthropology – is very firmly rooted in the classic liberal tradition that underpins 
western academia.  Kant’s enlightenment mantra – “Dare to be wise!” – called for 
individuals to exercise their own capacity for critical thought without relying on the 
guidance of establishment authority figures, and to question the conventional wisdom 
that such figures hand down.  “For true enlightenment,” Kant said, “all that is needed 
is freedom.”  Anthropology has taken up this enlightenment project and added its own 
spin, drawing on the perspectives of other cultures to gain distance from the 
entrenched assumptions and taken-for-granted values of our own.  Indeed, many of 
the Boasians believed that this cross-cultural, relativist stance provided the 
anthropologist with a sort of transcendence from the cognitive limitations of any 
single culture, and therefore a special degree of freedom.  
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Yet it is not only their own freedom that anthropologists have been concerned to 
achieve, but also that of others.  We can see this even in the early stages of the 
discipline’s history.  The Boasian tradition began in large part as an anti-racist project 
– an ambitious attempt to upend the dominant social hierarchies that characterized 
20th century America.  More recently, anthropologists have been at the forefront of 
challenging gender hierarchies and other social inequalities, both at home and abroad.  
It is for these reasons that anthropology departments across the world have developed 
a reputation for being bastions of progressive thought and action. At the heart of this 
movement is a concern, once again, for human freedom, conceived as the 
emancipation of the subject from the constraints of oppressive social norms, of which 
hierarchies of race and gender seem to be the most troubling. On a more abstract 
theoretical level, we can see this concern for freedom reflected in the longstanding 
debates that anthropologists have engaged over the tension between structure and 
agency (cf. Sahlins 1995; Obeysekere 1992), with contemporary consensus leaning 
heavily toward the latter – a stance that is as much political as analytical.  As we 
pointed out above, the analytical project of recognizing and describing the agency of 
the subject against the material and symbolic structures that “constrain” or 
overdetermine agency runs parallel to the political project of emancipating the subject 
by challenging hierarchies.     
 
In other words, a deep tension exists in liberal thought between the value of individual 
freedom, on the one hand, and the social hierarchies that are thought to constrain 
freedom, on the other. In light of this tension, we need to ask ourselves: why are 
freedom and hierarchy regarded as incompatible?  We argue that it has to do with the 
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particularly Western conception of freedom that this formulation assumes.  Webb 
Keane’s work offers insights into how this plays out.  Keane has demonstrated that 
the dominant Western conception of freedom – that which underpins narratives of 
modernity and progress – focuses on human emancipation as a project of progressive 
self-mastery.  Keane writes: “If in the past humans were in thrall to illegitimate rulers, 
rigid traditions, and unreal fetishes, as they become modern they realize the true 
character of human agency.  Conversely, those who seem to persist in displacing their 
own agency onto such rulers, traditions, or fetishes are out of step with the times, 
anachronistic premoderns or anti-moderns” (Keane 2007:6).  Liberation, in other 
words, is conceived as the emancipation of the individual from the arbitrary authority 
of others.   
 
This conception of freedom presupposes a fundamental dichotomy between the 
individual and society.  The individual is regarded as the proper locus of reason and 
the source of “authentic” desire; the individual exists prior to society, which is 
imagined as a series of external constraints.  Social norms, rules, values and beliefs 
are thought to overdetermine the desires of individuals and appear as a form of 
bondage.  The process of liberation, then, involves excavating and asserting the inner, 
autonomous agency of the individual.  It is, above all, a process of self-realization.  
These assumptions about the tension between individual and society appear 
repeatedly in Western social science (Sahlins 2008), and in various iterations inform 
the work of Hegel, Freud, and much of the structural functionalist tradition.  Indeed, 
they even seem to inform Marx’s theory of ideology: the false consciousness handed 
down by society – which reflects the interests of a ruling class – precludes objective 
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knowledge of the external world and therefore stifles the expression of true political 
agency and desire.   
 
In the light of all this, it becomes clear why hierarchy poses a problem for the liberal 
conception of freedom: it represents an arrangement wherein persons are embedded in 
relations of interdependence that appear to hamper their prospects for self-mastery. 
The subject entangled in hierarchies appears as the antithesis of the modern political 
subject: the disembedded, free-thinking, rights-bearing individual.  
 
We know, of course, that these assumptions are incorrect. The subject does not 
precede society, or social norms, but is in fact formed through those norms.  Michel 
Foucault and Judith Butler are often credited with pointing this out, but it is an 
observation that is nearly as old as anthropology itself: persons do not exist outside of 
social relationships (or, as the Boasians would have it, persons do not exist outside of 
culture).  If this is the case, then the idea of agency – and freedom – needs to be 
rethought.  The subject’s capacity for agency does not inhere in some authentic inner 
self or a prior substratum of personhood.  Rather, it is a product of the processes – the 
norms and the relationships, including hierarchical ones – that produce the subject in 
the first place. As Charles Taylor has argued, human agency is what is possible within 
some given moral orientation, rather than some absolute freedom from orientations 
(1989:33).  In the light of this, we need to relativize our conception of agency to take 
account of choices that people make and desires that they hold which may not accord 
with our assumptions about what counts as liberation or resistance (for efforts toward 
this end, see Frank 2006, Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Peacock 2013).   
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As some of the contributions to this volume demonstrate, hierarchy often provides a 
very powerful moral orientation for human action and desire.  Indeed, in many cases 
it appears that people seek to reestablish the conditions for what they consider to be 
justice, well-being, and full human flourishing by constituting or reconstituting 
hierarchies rather than by seeking to abolish them.  This seems to be increasingly true 
at those points where people are confronted with alternative models of society and 
personhood.  Christianity, democracy, and development, for example, often seek to 
challenge preexisting social structures and values, many of which are hierarchical.  It 
is at these conjunctures, when hierarchy is called into question, that it is often most 
vehemently defended, and as a result most clearly articulated.  This presents a 
challenge to the standard narrative of globalization.  Rather than creating 
communities of liberal cosmopolitans, globalizing forces like democracy or 
development often produce what Meyer and Geschiere (1999) have called “cultural 
closure” – new longings for forms of social order that often pivot on the value of 
hierarchy, whether as a social form, as an ideology, or as nostalgia for an idealized 
past. 
 
But cultural closure along these lines does not only happen “out there”; it also takes 
place in the West itself, and often gives way to social movements of the sort that 
provoke scholars’ own political reactions.  In the United States, for instance, we see 
this sort of cultural closure among conservatives who express longing to return to the 
putative “Golden Age” of the American family with its stable gender hierarchies 
(Ginsburg 1998).  In Europe it appears in the form of right-wing nationalist groups 
that seek to reassert racial hierarchies as a supposed solution to economic crisis.  It 
may be that these more familiar, experience-near expressions of hierarchy are driving 
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the renewed interest in the subject among Western scholars today.  Or perhaps it is 
being driven by the recognition that Western society is marked by inequality to an 
unprecedented degree, yielding a highly stratified social order, reminiscent of 
feudalism, that some pundits have sought to portray as a natural hierarchy (e.g. Clark 
2014). 
 
How are we to think about ideologies or social movements that reject liberal values in 
this manner, and express preference for hierarchies?  Confronted with such situations 
where class struggle is at stake, progressives and leftists tend to resort to explanations 
that rely on theories of false consciousness.  Even when class struggle is not at stake, 
it can be tempting to say that when people represent hierarchy favorably, they are 
merely reproducing an ideology promoted by those on the senior end of the scale – 
men, elders, and patrons – to perpetuate the subservience of those on the junior end of 
the scale – women, minors, and clients (e.g. Crehan 1997).  These explanations are 
not entirely without merit, but they often assume that there is something intrinsic to 
humans that should predispose them to reject hierarchy – an assumption that we 
would argue does not always bear out ethnographically.  Such explanations ignore the 
possibility that in some contexts people might actually regard hierarchy as central to 
their conceptions of the good and their ideas about human flourishing.  To paraphrase 
the words of Saba Mahmood (2005:xi), we cannot arrogantly assume that liberal 
forms of life exhaust ways of living meaningfully and richly in this world; we have to 
be able to parochialize our own political certitude. 
 
On wanting hierarchy (back): Two examples from Southern Africa 
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Southern Africa – where the two of us have conducted fieldwork for many years, and 
where our interest in hierarchy first emerged – is an interesting place to consider some 
of these issues. The two case studies we discuss here, from South Africa and Zambia, 
admittedly represent a narrow geographical and cultural focus.  However, our 
observations can be read back on the articles in this volume that engage other regions 
as a means of expanding – and doubtless challenging – the framework presented in 
the introduction. 
 
During the decade leading up to the South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, 
it became clear that not all black South Africans necessarily wanted to sign on to the 
African National Congress’ (ANC) vision of a liberal democratic future.  Indeed, in 
rural Zululand large numbers of people were so disturbed by the prospect that they 
mobilized vigilante militias under the banner of Inkatha in an attempt to sabotage the 
ANC-led revolution.  While they embraced the principles of racial equality and 
universal franchise, many questioned the underlying idea that all individuals are 
autonomous and ontologically equal – especially in relation to gender and kinship 
hierarchies.   
 
This skepticism persists today.  As Hickel (2012, 2015) has argued, many people who 
retain deep ties to rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal perceive liberalism as a threat to the 
hierarchical social order that remains crucial to their conceptions of fruition and 
collective wellbeing.  By equalizing individuals across boundaries of gender and 
generation, liberalism dismantles kinship hierarchies and reduces the world to a state 
of sterile sameness that opens the door to serious misfortunes.  Dismantle hierarchies, 
they say, and the very foundations of social reproduction fall apart.  Many in rural 
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KwaZulu-Natal believe that the increasing poverty and unemployment rates that 
characterize contemporary South Africa – which we might regard as the consequence 
of the government’s embrace of neoliberal economic policies – are due rather to the 
liberal social policies that the ANC promotes under the banner of development and 
progress.  People who hold this view seek to restore their good fortune by ritually 
reestablishing or reasserting hierarchies in the home, specifically through the sacrifice 
of cattle and the distribution of meat. 
 
It is tempting to regard this position – this valorization of hierarchy – as flowing from 
a sort of primordial location, a holdover from a premodern past.  In fact, it is a wholly 
modern phenomenon.  Hickel (2015) shows that the hierarchical order cherished by 
rural Zulus proceeds in part from the Native Administration policies of late 
colonialism, which governed rural areas by imposing a set of so-called customary 
laws that ossified hierarchies as a way of extending control into the minutia of 
domestic life.  Today the rules of hierarchy are often naturalized as “traditional,” even 
though evidence suggests that social order in precolonial Natal was a good deal more 
flexible.  This point serves as a cautionary tale in our present discussion.  Contrary to 
the developmentalist trajectory presupposed by thinkers like Maine and de 
Tocqueville, and to some extent Dumont, hierarchy can be just as modern as 
individualism or egalitarianism.  Turning our attention to another ethnographic case 
from southern Africa, we are given a further example in which hierarchy is reasserted 
in the face of individualized egalitarianism.   
 
Christianity, particularly in its Protestant guises, has historically been associated with 
egalitarianism and individualism.  Weber, Mauss, Dumont, and Foucault have been 
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the most important thinkers behind this idea, and recent work in the anthropology of 
Christianity has often – though not always – emphasized the individualist and 
egalitarian thrust of this religion (e.g. Robbins 2004; cf. Daswani 2011).  
Pentecostalism, a form of Protestantism that has witnessed exponential growth across 
the globe in recent decades, takes Christian egalitarianism still further in its emphasis 
on spiritual gifts such as prophecy and glossolalia.  Because Pentecostals take 
seriously the biblical promise that the Holy Spirit will be poured out on “all flesh”5 
regardless of age or sex, from a theological perspective theirs is among the most 
egalitarian forms of Christianity.  Indeed, in at least some instances, Pentecostal 
adherence has meant the breaking down of preexisting social hierarchies, particularly 
those of seniority (van Dijk 1992). 
 
Despite the egalitarian impulse of Pentecostalism, however, in many parts of the 
world the most important social ties developed in Pentecostal groups are structured by 
hierarchies of charismatic authority.  This is certainly the case on the Zambian 
Copperbelt, where the key relationship in Pentecostal congregations is that between 
leaders and laypeople.  As Haynes has argued in greater detail elsewhere (Haynes 
2012, forthcoming), these ties are hierarchical, often framed in terms of one of the 
most salient hierarchies in Zambia, that of generation, as on the Copperbelt pastors 
are regularly referred to as “parents” (bafyashi).  What this very brief ethnographic 
outline suggests is that in Copperbelt Pentecostalism hierarchy emerges as a clear 
choice in the face of other models of social organization.  That said, we must also 
bear in mind that the Pentecostal preference for hierarchy does not mean that there is 
no place for egalitarian relationships.  While much of Pentecostal life is devoted to 
creating and maintaining hierarchical ties between leaders and laypeople, the 
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egalitarian “charismatic space” of Pentecostal ritual (Eriksen 2014) allows existing 
hierarchies to be broken down or replaced when necessary – for instance, if they 
become corrupted by unwelcome economic interests (Haynes 2015).  In this case, 
egalitarianism is made to serve hierarchical ends, but it has not for that reason ceased 
to be an important part of Pentecostal social life.   
 
The foregoing examples, along with the various contributions to this special issue, 
provide a clear illustration of the sort of social movements we invoked above.  Having 
had direct encounters with liberalism or individualism, and having been presented 
with spaces in which they could legitimately organize their social lives according to 
these principles, the groups and communities we have just described have chosen 
another way.  In these cases, hierarchy is regarded as socially desirable, and a social 
world where at least some key relationships are hierarchical is considered a good to 
be pursued.  Expressed in this way, we can begin to think of hierarchy in relationship 
to value, and it is to this topic that we now turn.   
 
Hierarchy, value, and values 
 
Anthropological discussions of value often begin by outlining the various ways in 
which this term has been used in the discipline (e.g. Otto and Willerslev 2013b: 1-2; 
Graeber 2001: 1-22; Miller 2008: 1122-1123).  These differences are most simply 
described by the distinction between “value” (use-, exchange-, economic-) and 
“values” (family-, cultural-, religious-, aesthetic-).  Following David Graeber 
(Graeber 2013: 224), who suggests that there is more commonality than difference 
between value and values so defined, we would like to reframe this distinction as one 
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between “value” as a verb and “value” as a noun.6  The notion of value as a verb 
refers to the process of valuing, and encompasses not only structuralist theories of 
value (what Graeber, drawing on Saussure, calls “value as meaningful difference” 
(2001: 2)), but also economic theories of value, which are about equivalence, 
exchange, and so forth.  In contrast, value as a noun refers to notions of the good.  
While this concept certainly may have moral implications, as an ethnographic object 
(as opposed to a philosophical one) the most important feature of the good is its 
connection to a certain model of sociality: values are ideas about a good social and 
relational world.   
 
Understood in these terms, values as nouns can be defined as those parts of culture 
that transform the constellation of relationships, actions, and objects we find in any 
society from a neutral field of open-ended potential to a field that is differentiated, a 
field with topography.  Simply put, values value.  Stated yet another way, the good 
structures the move from is to ought, from difference to value, and therefore serves as 
the metric that animates the process of valuation – value as a verb.  Without some 
notion of the good, it is hard to understand why someone would choose to exchange 
taro with a person in a neighboring village, or build a table to sell to someone else, or 
buy that same table; nor can we see why people would prefer to marry their cross-
cousins, or regard men as more important to women – or indeed, pursue hierarchical 
forms of social organization in the face of other options.  These actions are rendered 
sensible in a framework of values that exists beyond the purely material or structural 
(a point that Sahlins (1976) has made very well). 
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Joel Robbins has provided a detailed description of what this process of valuation 
looks like in his work on the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea (e.g. Robbins 2004, 
2009).  For the Urapmin, a good social world is one that is characterized by the 
formation and maintenance of egalitarian social relationships, which are in turn 
fundamental to Melanesian models of the person (Strathern 1988).  Following 
Dumont, Robbins therefore argues that the value that he calls “relationalism” 
determines the position of all other elements of Urapmin society.7  This means that 
those ideas, institutions, or practices that most effectively produce relationships are 
more prominent, “more elaborately worked out” (Robbins 2009: 66) than those that 
do not.  Here again, the particular hierarchical ordering of values as nouns – that is, 
the particular model of the good – found in a given community is responsible for the 
arrangement of all sorts of other things: the kinds of relationships people pursue, the 
objects they choose to display, and the rituals they perform.  The arrangement of 
values in a particular society therefore reverberates through it in numerous visible 
ways, which means that values are observable in social life, as values “find their 
existence in people” (Rio and Smedal 2009a: 20).   
 
One final thing to bear in mind when examining how values are organized is the 
possibility that this order can change.  One could take this not only from Dumont’s 
work on the emergence of individualism in the West (Dumont 1986; also see Robbins 
2013b), but also from Weber’s notion of value “spheres,” in which various domains 
of value – religious, political, aesthetic – compete for superior positions of influence 
(see Weber 1946: 323-359).  In the cases provided above, we have seen how this 
competition can involve the position of hierarchy in the constellation of elements that 
make up a particular society.  Similarly, it is important to pay attention to when and 
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where hierarchy is elaborated.  In most cases, the hierarchy does not define all social 
contexts.  In the examples from southern Africa that we described above, people 
might demonstrate a strong preference for hierarchy within the family, or within the 
church, but reject hierarchy in other social spaces.  To value hierarchy in some 
scenarios does not preclude an egalitarian ethic in others.  
 
It should be clear in these southern African examples that hierarchy is central to local 
models of a good society.  This does not mean, however, that hierarchy is a good in 
and of itself, but rather that hierarchy is a good because it is part of a larger 
ideological framework of value.  In the case of rural KwaZulu-Natal, for instance, 
hierarchy is valued as a means to fruition – to achieving health and good fortune and 
the conditions for social reproduction (Hickel 2015).  Indeed, in many cases people 
neglect kinship hierarchies until their fortunes take a turn for the worse, at which 
point they seek to police them with singular rigor.  In the case of the Copperbelt, the 
importance of hierarchy follows from its connection to what Haynes (forthcoming) 
has called “moving.”  On the Copperbelt, moving refers to measurable advancement, 
whether progress through the lifecourse in the form of marriage and children, or 
upward mobility indexed by consumer goods from a new suit to a secondhand Toyota 
sedan.  For Pentecostals, it also carries spiritual components.  Importantly, moving 
does not refer to progress as such, but rather to a larger social process in which 
personal advancement is achieved through social relationships.  Put differently, 
moving is not so much a matter of getting ahead as it is of being pulled up.  There are 
multiple relational forms through which moving can be realized, but the most 
important of these are ties of patronage or hierarchical “dependence” (Ferguson 
2013), which facilitate moving especially well.  Hierarchy is therefore important to 
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people on the Copperbelt as a means of realizing local models of a good social world, 
in this case a world in which everyone is moving. 
 
The foregoing discussion has provided a framework through which to approach the 
remaining contributions to this special issue.  While different articles address different 
aspects of the model we have developed here, and while they vary in their theoretical 
orientation, one nevertheless sees the thread of value running through these 
discussions of hierarchy.  In the following section, we provide a brief outline of the 
articles in this volume.   
 
Overview of contributions 
 
Signe Howell’s paper provides an excellent illustration of the sort of contest of values 
that we have already seen in the Copperbelt and Zulu cases.  In the Lio example that 
Howell describes, the conflict between hierarchical and egalitarian social systems 
reveals that egalitarianism has been incorporated into Lio society without being 
allowed to transform it in any significant way.  Traditional Lio social organization is 
hierarchical, and the authority of priest-leaders structures a political-religious system 
that Howell, using Dumont’s terms, refers to as “holist.”  With the arrival of 
Catholicism, Lio hierarchy has been challenged by an egalitarianism that emphasizes 
individual relationships with God (Dumont 1986).  Identification with the Catholic 
Church has become important to the Lio primarily as a means of interacting with the 
state, as national identity cards require Indonesian citizens to indicate their affiliation 
with one of five World Religions.  Lio also participate in a circumscribed set of 
Catholic rituals, narrowly defined according to the category of “religion.”  
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Nevertheless, Howell argues that hierarchy remains the encompassing value, as 
Catholic egalitarianism is only allowed to order less important domains of Lio life – 
in this case, the small, discrete category of “religion” or occasional interactions with 
the state.  Howell suggests that, ironically, the subordinate role given to religion in 
this case, which clearly falls short of the Catholic ideal of conversion, presents a 
striking parallel to the way that post-Vatican II efforts toward “inculturation” have 
treated culture.  To wit, culture here is largely reduced to a set of constructed (mostly 
aesthetic) particles and objects, a few rituals, songs, or pieces of clothing – what 
Carneiro da Cunha calls “culture in quote marks” (quoted in Vilaça 2014: S323).  Just 
as Catholic practice has made culture into a reified and modular category, something 
to be encompassed by religion, Lio culture, as a totalizing system, has done the same 
with religion.  For the Lio, then, a hierarchy that precedes from the ancestors through 
the authority of priest-leaders remains the central mode of social organization, as well 
as, Howell adds, a model for the structure of values.   
 
Christianity also figures in the Ethiopian Orthodox case presented by Diego Maria 
Malara and Tom Boylston, though to very different effect.  To wit, Christianity serves 
as part of a larger relational framework that Malara and Boylston argue structures 
Amhara social life.  This framework is fundamentally asymmetrical and undergirds 
not only the hierarchical patronage ties that are familiar from the ethnographic 
literature on Ethiopia, but also intimate ties of love and care.  Included here is the 
bond between a mother and child, as well as that between the Virgin Mary and 
Orthodox Christians; in both of these cases, love is asymmetrical because it is 
unconditional and can never be repaid.  Love also enters into other asymmetrical ties 
through the work of mediators – often, again, mothers or the Virgin – who are willing 
  24 
and able to intercede on behalf of those they care for.  It is in the light of this model of 
“vertical love” that Malara and Boylston are able to address the difficult question of 
whether we can think of hierarchy as an Amhara “value” in the sense of a positive 
moral good.  On the one hand, there is no question that hierarchy can lead to coercion 
and even exploitation.  On the other, it is clear in Malara and Boylston’s analysis that 
hierarchy is linked to some of the most intimate and important relationships in 
Ethiopian Orthodox society, and this is the key to understanding the place of 
asymmetry in Amhara relational life.  As the authors put it, “Without an account of 
vertical love and the daily practicalities of care and affection, it is difficult to see how 
a system as based on naked domination as Amhara has been supposed to be could 
ever be liveable, or how claims about the values and virtues of hierarchy could ever 
be convincing.”  In other words, if hierarchy is a value in Ethiopia it is not because 
people are blind to its potentially negative effects, or even simply because they enjoy 
the benefits of patronage; rather, hierarchy is part of local models of the good because 
it is central to the politics of care, to the most important sites of intimacy and 
protection.  
 
Fred Damon’s contribution takes a bold shot across time and space – drawing a 
number of classic anthropological texts and a variety of ethnographic contexts – to 
examine the role that destruction and sacrifice play in the production of human 
hierarchies.  Destruction, he says, seems necessary for the creation of difference, 
which allows for the elaboration of rank.  He begins with the example of the Kula 
ring, the site of his own original research.  In the Kula system, when one man sends a 
valuable to another he destroys part of himself: the giver’s name goes down (his body 
thereby depleted), while the receiver’s name goes up.  In other words, exchange 
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requires a kind of destruction, and destruction produces hierarchical difference.  A 
similar logic operated in the past in Polynesia, Damon argues, where literal human 
sacrifice served as the basis for hierarchy, and we can also see it at play in the 
lynching that became so common in the United States, especially the American South 
during the years following the Civil War, as a method of differentiating white from 
black. In each of these systems, continuity needs to be replaced by tangible 
discontinuity or differentiation in order for some kind of hierarchized semantic field 
to exist.  Destruction produces hierarchies, which are regarded as essential to a well-
ordered social totality.  Damon takes this one step further, and argues that we can 
understand the capitalist world system through this same lens.  Why does the United 
States devote so much of its wealth to overdeveloping its military capacity?  We like 
to think of this as “waste”, but Damon suggests it is necessary to the continuity of the 
world system in two ways: it mops up overaccumulated capital in order to avoid 
widespread devaluation, and it maintains the relative ranking of hegemonic positions.  
Mass destruction, be it wasting wealth on non-productive assets such as fighter planes 
or laying waste to entire cities, figures as an unfortunate but structural component of 
the modern world system. 
 
Stephan Feuchtwang’s contribution is equally grand and ambitious in its scope.  He 
mounts a fresh critique of the ahistorical and structuralist dimensions of Dumont’s 
approach to hierarchy with a corrective from another great French thinker, Dumont’s 
teacher Marcel Mauss.  While Dumont asserts a type-anti-type dualism between 
hierarchical and egalitarian societies, Feuchtwang derives from Mauss’ theory of 
“civilization” – and from Dumont’s concepts of encompassment and ideology – an 
argument that all societies, including avowedly egalitarian ones, hang on hierarchies 
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of valuation, distinction, and aspiration.  Indeed, Feuchtwang suggests that inasmuch 
as ideals of order, etiquette, civility, and so on are hierarchically organized, and 
distinguished from the values of “others” outside, hierarchy may even be intrinsic to 
the very concept of civilization itself – except in the case of specific hunter-gatherer 
civilizations.  So much for Dumont’s dualism.  As a corrective to Dumont’s tendency 
toward ahistorical analysis, Feuchtwang insists that anthropology should not shy away 
from exploring and analyzing the long processes by which hierarchies are formed and 
transformed through the history of specific civilizations.  By way of example, he takes 
us on a dizzying tour through some 6,000 years of China’s history, moving from early 
forms of social hierarchy in the archeological record to the rise of the imperial 
dynasties, illustrating how hierarchies have changed in that context along with the 
idea of civilization itself.   
 
Arsalan Khan offers a thoughtful ethnography of the Tablighi Jamaat in Pakistan, a 
local instantiation of what has become the fastest growing Islamic movement in the 
world.  Tablighis are interesting in that they maintain a strong stance against the 
Islamist movement that has become so powerful in Pakistan.  While Islamism seeks to 
use state power to legislate adherence to Islamic values, Tablighis believe that such 
efforts are in vain.  For them, the only way to draw Muslims back to Islamic piety is 
through proper praxis, specifically a distinct form of face-to-face preaching known as 
dawat, which involves extensive travelling in groups of men, going house-to-house 
across the country.  Even if these missionary efforts fail to refresh the religious 
commitments of others, they are important to the development of piety among the 
travellers themselves.  Dawat is efficacious toward this end not only through the 
discipline and sacrifice that it requires, but also through the relationships that it 
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produces: relationships that are hierarchical, modelled on kin relations between 
brothers and fathers with rankings laid out along a gradient of closeness to God.  As 
Khan puts it, “becoming a proper Islamic subject, one capable of living in Islamic 
terms, requires that one learn how to live in a hierarchically structured social world.” 
Tablighis regard Islamist praxis, by contrast, as inefficacious because it stresses the 
agency and autonomy of the individual, and therefore produces persons who disregard 
their place in the hierarchical order.  Because of this, Tablighis blame Islamism for 
disrupting the harmonious order of the family, causing moral chaos (fitna) in 
communities, and ultimately contributing to the general sense of violence and crisis 
that pervades Karachi today. 
 
Finally, Olaf Smedal’s discussion of hierarchy among the Ngadha of Flores, 
Indonesia provides a helpful counter-example to many of the other cases treated here.  
Smedal describes the slow erosion of Ngadha hierarchy through the increasingly 
common practice of noble women marrying lower-ranking men.  When this happens, 
a woman loses her rank and, more importantly, is not able to pass that rank along to 
her children.  Although she can be ritually reincorporated into her family, as Smedal 
describes, a noble woman who has married a common man erases aristocratic 
distinction in the next generation.  As more and more women find themselves in this 
position, the long-term dissolution of Ngadha hierarchy is not difficult to imagine.  
Rather than defend hierarchy as socially necessary, then, the Ngadha are slowly and 
painfully watching it slip away.  Smedal is clear that this is not a rejection of 
hierarchy as such – at least not on the part of the nobility (though commoners are 
generally happy enough with its dissolution).  Rather, aristocratic hierarchy seems in 
this example to be a victim of its own inflexibility, particularly in the light of Ngadha 
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women’s increased access to education in other parts of the country, where they are 
unlikely to find marriage partners from the Ngadha nobility.  Smedal suggests that the 
reason this shift is possible is that nobility was never necessary to the Ngadha social 
world in the first place, that while Ngadha sociality was structured by purity in a 
manner similar to Dumont’s description of India, the social classes that exemplified 
purity never encompassed the whole of Ngadha society.  In this way, Smedal’s 
example provides a helpful compliment to the definition of hierarchy we have offered 
above by separating it from encompassment.   
 
Conclusion 
 
While social scientists would agree that hierarchy operates in all places, there are few 
who place it at the center of their analysis, and fewer still who seek to understand it 
on its own terms, as part of a model of a good society.  In this special issue, our aim is 
to do precisely that: to explore people’s insistence that hierarchy is good for them and 
for their communities, and to do so in a framework that takes these ideas seriously.  
What we have found is that hierarchy is remarkably assertive, and that in many places 
it is central to local understandings of the good.  This is not to say that hierarchy is not 
implicated in power relations; indeed, nearly all of the papers show that it is.  
However, hierarchy is much more than power, and certainly much more than 
inequality.  
 
As we seek to move beyond, or at least break new ground within, the concerns that 
have dominated the discipline for the past two decades – namely, those of power and 
resistance, especially in the light of the global spread of neoliberalism – the message 
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of this volume is that anthropologists will do well to keep hierarchy in view.  This is 
not to say that it is not our business to expose and denounce injustice where we find 
it.  On the contrary, what we are suggesting is that, at least in some instances, 
hierarchy may in fact be a key way of resisting the atomizing effects of liberalization, 
in particular.  And even in those instances where this is not specifically the case, the 
critical examination of liberalism that has made such an impact on anthropology in 
the recent past should highlight the importance of taking seriously seemingly illiberal, 
hierarchical ways of organizing social life and being in the world.  As our discussion 
in this introduction and the contributions to this special issue make clear, what 
emerges from a whole range of social conjunctures is the fact that people seem to 
want hierarchy – or, in some cases, to want their hierarchy back.  Anthropology must 
do the difficult and politically contentious work of understanding why. 
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Notes: 
1 What we do not offer here is a close reading and summary of Dumont’s corpus, 
which would require another volume in itself. 
2 One of Dumont’s favorite examples here is that of “goods and services.”  On the one 
hand, services are encompassed by goods as the dominant category, included with 
them as essentially part of the whole.  On the other, services and goods are quite 
different from one another, and in that difference contrary to each other (see Dumont 
1986: 252). 
3 Indeed, Greg Acciaioli (2009) has argued that the definition of hierarchy as 
encompassment in the revised (1980) edition of Homo Hierarchicus does not fit well 
with the ethnographic material presented in the same volume, which instead suggests 
a model of hierarchy more similar to that we propose here. 
4 In the light of these examples, it may be that this definition works especially well 
with the material from southern Africa that we draw on in this introduction.  Whether 
or not this is the case, we think that this definition of hierarchy is best suited to 
addressing those situations in which a preference for hierarchy is actively asserted, as 
people appear to be choosing hierarchical modes of social organization despite being 
confronted with other relational possibilities. 
5 Joel 2: 28 
6 Although Graeber does not use this terminology, he makes a similar argument in 
Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value (2001) in his sustained analysis of what 
he calls “action” and “reflection,” which in many ways correspond to the notion of 
value as a verb and as a noun, respectively.  Similarly, Michael Lambek’s (2013: 155) 
brief discussion of Marx’s labor theory of value and Karl Polanyi’s notion of fictitious 
commodities points to this distinction.  Naomi Haynes also makes this distinction in 
the introduction to her book (Haynes forthcoming).   
7 Robbins, who makes good use of Dumont’s ideological holism in this analysis, 
refers to relationalism as the “paramount value” of the Urapmin. 
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